"From the Shadows"

"From the Shadows" is the name of the memoirs of Robert M. Gates, our current Secretary of Defense. It was published in 1996, three years after the end of his two year term as Director of the CIA. A book that has not been widely read, it is fascinating on several levels.

Gates was the first CIA Director to grow up in the CIA. Recruited out of graduate school at Indiana University, he spent his entire career (until 1993)at either the CIA or in the White House with the National Security Council.

This makes for fascinating inside history, and insight. By and large, Gates presents himself as a practical, well-meaning middle of the roader. And as an ultimate professional.

He rose quickly in the organization, and was asked to work for the NSC in the Ford administration. National Security Advisor Brzezinski asked him stay on into the first Carter years. He has worked with every president since Johnson and every CIA director since Colby.

What does he think of the presidents with whom he worked closely? Nixon was a very good president, when his paranoia did not get in the way. Ford, he liked. Carter has gotten a bad rap; his policies set the standard for Reagan. Reagan had vision and purpose, but began to lose it mentally early into his second term. George H.W. Bush, he loved.

What about the CIA itself? Clearly bureaucratic. A lot of turf protection. A tremendous amout of rivalry. Some politics (depending on the director) in finalizing analytic pieces. Soviet moles (John Walker, Ames Aldrich).

Foreign policy in the government? Not bureaucratic at the highest level, but continual disagreements (until Bush I) between State, Defense, CIA, and the NSC. At time, particularly when Schultz was at State, Weinberger at Defense, and Casey at the CIA, it was vicious. Schultz being the "let's negotiate" guy, and Weinberger and Casey being the "we should not talk to them" types. More than you can imagine.

The focus was always on the USSR (and sometimes on its puppet in the Caribbean). CIA directors all had their own approaches. The most extreme case was, of course, Bill Casey, who wanted to use resources to support the Contras, fighting the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Congress prohibits the funding, so Casey (legal opinion in hand) decides that non-government and foreign governmental sources should be encouraged. But he did not want the CIA involved, which is how the White House and Oliver North got started.

At the same time, there was a widespread feeling that Iran should be given the right to buy some advanced weaponry. This today may seem weird, but at the time, there were a number of reasons for this. First, there was the thought that it would strengthen moderates in the government. Second, it would counter the Soviet strength in Afghanistan. Third, it would help the release of some hostages in Lebanon (even then through Hezbollah).

What the CIA may not have known, is that North and others used funds raised through the sale of arms to Iran in order to support the Contras.

It is not perfectly clear how much the CIA actually knew about Iran/Contra. When Bill Casey was suddenly taken ill with a brain tumor and died shortly after, Reagan nominated Gates to take his place as CIA director. His nomination did not last very long, because of Iran/Contra. Gates, who claims he knew nothing, was in a terrible position: if he knew about Iran/Contra, he was involved in violating the law; if he did not, what value is the CIA anyway?

This last question is a good one. There is so much analysis going on, but what good does it do? On a direct basis, it is hard to say. And, with the spy scandals, maybe we lose more than we gain? But perhaps just the idea of a CIA is helpful, if not its activities. The fact appears to be that there is no major gain that can be ascribed either to CIA analysis or operations.

Finally, the book chronicles the end of the Soviet Union, the death of Brezhnev, the temporizing of Andopov and Chernenko, the rise of Gorbachev, the maturation of Yeltsin. And their ultimate failures.

The CIA (but along with others) predicted (with some trepidation)that the Soviet Union was in an untenable economic crisis, and had no way out. This makes for some inevitability, but, to Gates, Gorbachev, for all of his good qualities, was hopelessly naive, and that this naivete helped bring about the destruction of the USSR. He also gives credit to Bush, for his personality in treating the Soviet reformers on a one-to-one basis, to Reagan for, in effect, keeping his eye on the prize, and surprisingly, Jimmy Carter for his human rights campaign, which he feels set the stage for everything that happened to breakdown Communist control in Eastern Europe.

This is one of the most surprising elements of the book, his treatment of Jimmy Carter. He was not close to Carter, and maintains that Carter's communication skills within the White House was poor at best, but he thinks that Carter's foreign policy was quite effective (and that Carter's defense cuts were, with one exception, proper cuts related to outmoded programs), and that the Reagan White House built on the Carter program. That there was complete continuity between the two administrations.

Having been forced to withdraw as CIA director/nominee in the 1980s, he was renominated by Bush in 1991, received Senate support, and served for two years.

In 1993, for the first time, he found himself outside of government, winding up with quite a good position: president of Texas A & M, where he by all accounts did an outstanding job. Bush II called him back to serve as Secretary of Defense after Don Rumsfeld resigned. But all of this will have to await the next book.